The journalistic fi eld is a social space, a space of relationships defi ning social positions and endowed with some specifi city, which structures and is structured by a symbolic border that establishes and objectifi es an inner and an outer position, defi nes what is specifi cally journalistic, and diff erentiates what is and what is not journalistic. Like all fi elds, the journalistic fi eld is a structured space of positions, defi ned and redefi ned by its agents. Acceptance of these positions is a condition for playing the game of relationships which are specifi c to this space. As in any game, its rules must be previously known and accepted. Unlike most games, these rules are not imposed -on a permanent basis -by some contriver of the pastime, but rather are the object of constant struggle and redefi nition.
serious journalism are epithets that betray the existence of social categories whose meanings are shared by the agents in the fi eld and structure their connection with it. These categories only fi nd their structuring role when they are refl ectively understood, that is, in their mutual relationship, like "north", which makes sense only in relation to "south". Thus, the investigation of the relationships constituting a fi eld, such as the journalistic fi eld, calls for more than a mere description of positions occupied and struggles/strategies for the maintenance or subversion of the current power relationship. It requires assessing to what degree these structuring axes have been defi ned and redefi ned over the particular history of the fi eld.
For this reason, not all reasonably stable groups of agents purporting to produce news constitute a journalistic fi eld. In the fi rst place, if this social space is to be considered a fi eld, its journalistic agents must acknowledge one or more objectives as the objectives of a shared struggle. In the journalistic fi eld, one of the main objectives of struggle is the very defi nition of genuine journalism, that is, what is a good journalistic account, a good report, a good schedule, etc.
In the second place, there must be people willing to play the game, the journalistic game which almost invariably hides its adversarial nature under the guise of an information apostolate or mission. It is a game in which the interest in the prizes is disguised as a disinterested representation of public interest. A journalistic fi eld exists only when the rules of the game -although they are always at stake -are known and acknowledged by its agents. In this disposition lie the strategies of subversion available to dominated subjects wishing to leave their positions and the strategies of conservation for dominant subjects.
Thus, in each fi eld there is a set of people who, in accepting to play, implicitly accept the rules and the value of specifi c prizes. Maybe this can account for the relative conformity with which students of journalism accept the demeaning (and not always legal) conditions proposed by employers as "the only way" of entering the fi eld.
The third law of fi elds is the organic tendency to preclude or hinder the action of any outside agents that are intent on subverting the rules for entrance, value defi nition, and access to prizes. This makes the fi eld not only a space of confl ict and social struggle -using the jargon favored by Bourdieu -but possibly a space for complicity, where the esprit de corps would prevent any revolution that might jeopardize its survival.
The institution of journalistic space entails the imposition of a border separating those who are prepared to enter the game of adversarial production of news and those who, while taking part in certain stages of its production, are excluded from it. This exclusion stems, apart from the offi cial barriers imposed by the requirement for possession of a diploma, from the inability to convert a set of referentials, both conceptual and practical, such as linguistic stance, which are requisite for entrance in the fi eld.
The constitution of a strictly journalistic competence -the technical mastery of knowledge that is removed from the sheer recommendations of common sense -disqualifi es other criteria for assessing reality which are pculiar to other social universes. Therefore, the schedule as the imparting of a certain value, of a strictly journalistic nature, to a fact, objectifi es a unique practical knowledge, constituted over a long scholastic and professional trajectory that is not to be mistaken for other social representations. Thus, a lecture on journalistic ethics, whether good or bad, does not usually justify its being accorded news status. Even though its worth may be indisputable according to scholarly standards, the lecture is irrelevant according to the criteria for news production in the journalistic fi eld. It would be relevant if something unusual had taken place during its course, such as a disagreement between students followed by violent confrontation and death.
The distance between the view of a lay source and that of a professional journalist is not at all accidental. It institutes a power relationship combining two diff erent sets of assumptions, two world views. This distance is apparent, for instance, in the familiarity with television technology displayed by a mediator in a political debate, an information professional, as compared to that of the participants.
As opposed to law, economics, and other social activities, journalism does not require a particular usage of ordinary language. Since, in principle, it is designed for larger numbers of people, news does not demand specifi c knowledge to be understood. Therefore, the relative autonomization of the journalistic space does not rely on a symbolic disruption representing this or that jargonizing of professional activity. Whereas in law, economics, and medicine, linguistic codes have a part in defi ning the limits of the social universe in which they are produced, journalism employs a device which is less conspicuous, more subtle, and, accordingly, more effi cient: method.
The journalistic space serves as a neutral location producing at fi rst a veritable neutralization of the axiological (worth-imparting) content of common sense with which events are suff used. While they are supposedly indiff erent to (although not uninterested in) fact and prepared to grasp present time, these specialized agents, unintentionally and unwittingly, eff ect a neutralizing distance which is inscribed in the innermost depths of professional habitus: the dispositions to distancing, taking shape in a corporate, journalistic "duty" to preserve "exclusive possession" are brought to mind in all the stages of the professional education and training of neophytes.
The transformation of a phenomenal reality, with its ceaseless fl ux of causes and eff ects, into a printed or electronic fl ash of present time, a hierarchical and dramatized piece of reality, is inscribed in the very existence of a specialized professional body, which is relatively autonomous in the face of social interests involving any reconstruction of reality. This body is charged with defi ning and presenting reality, with organizing, according to codifi ed forms, the public manifestation of social confl icts, and giving them solutions socially recognized as impartial in their having been defi ned on the basis of previously established rules of journalistic deontology.
It is this relatively autonomous body of professionals that we call "the journalistic fi eld". When analyzing its historical formation, Bourdieu (1994: 4) points out that "the journalistic fi eld as such was formed in the 19th century, around the opposition between the newspapers that off ered 'nouvelles' (novelties), preferably sensational, or, rather, 'à sensation' (for sensation), and newspapers that off ered analyses and 'commentaries', and strove to stand apart from the former by vigorously affi rming their claim to the values of objectivity".
The defi nition of fi eld proposed by Bourdieu, namely, a structured space of positions, where agents compete for specifi c prizes and observe specifi c rules, calls for some preliminary observations. First, the theory of social fi elds does not account for the whole of social life, that is, not all social activities take place within fi elds. Thus, we point out that the theory of fi elds devotes a lot of eff ort to explaining the great scenes where power struggles unfold, but not much eff ort to understanding those who prepare the scenes, build the stages, manufacture their props, sweep the corridors, copy documents, type letters, etc.
According to Bourdieu, every social fi eld causes a sort of delusion in its members, a delusion that all struggles, the rules regulating their moves, the prizes pertaining to each fi eld, are the outcomes of the subject' s deliberation, not defi ned by the inter-subjectivity of social relations or learned through socialization. It must be recognized, however, that other social worlds that do not fi t the defi nition of fi eld also rely on unacknowledged conventions for their existence. A good number of individuals in our societies (the lower classes, necessarily excluded from power fi elds) are situated "hors-champ" (outside the fi eld), immersed in a great "social space" having as its structuring axes only the amount and structure of (cultural and economic) capital possessed. This is recognized by Pierre Bourdieu when he explains that understanding a famous author' s work poses discrete problems as compared to understanding a "layman' s" discourse, and this is due "above all, to the author' s belonging to a fi eld" (BOURDIEU, 1992: 418) .
Given these exclusions, of "time outside the fi eld" and "actors outside the fi eld", it is revealing that this sociology not only is concerned with those who were practically "born in the fi eld" or "in the game" (the son of an actor who also becomes an actor, for instance), but also generalizes, sometimes abusively, this sort of situation: "Illusio is a kind of knowledge that is founded on the fact of one having been born in the game, of belonging to the game by right of birth: if I say I know the game in this way it means that it is under my skin, that it plays within me, without me" (BOURDIEU, 1993: 44) . And also: "Why is it important to think of the game as the place where we are born rather than as an arbitrarily instituted game?" (BOURDIEU, 1993: 49) .
Thus, we may be under this illusio, characteristic of a social world, without this world possessing the set of properties that would allow it to be defi ned as a fi eld. The family, for instance, although it never is a social fi eld, is structured around a series of implied norms and values ensuring its Another important warning against fi eld theory and therefore against journalistic fi eld theory is that affi liation does not ensure homogeneous engagement. One can live within a universe without being totally possessed by it, by its specifi c illusio. This means that belonging to a world does not ensure equal levels of engagement in the competition for its prizes or the adoption of strategies for attaining its specifi c capital. For instance, one may play tennis in a club once a week, just to relax, and not be ranked, like a professional player, nor be concerned with the objectives professional players struggle to achieve.
Thus, a social agent can also be a "consumer" of tennis matches and not practice the sport. Finally, he can also be materially inserted in the heart of the game and be free from the pressures that are inherent in the struggle and competition of the game, because he is responsible for looking after the grass at Wimbledon or is a member of the team that cleans the locker rooms at Roland Garros. In these three cases, the forces that act so powerfully on the tennis player -the professional, the actor enacting performances we can watch -do not apply.
The same thing happens in the journalistic fi eld. The existence of a space of struggle which is relatively autonomous and possesses its own rules, specifi c prizes and unique strategies is beyond dispute. The fact, however, is that the many kinds of agents within this universe do not belong to it with equal levels of engagement. Given the specifi city stemming from an increasing segmentation of journalistic activity, the level and intensity of engagement may vary signifi cantly. Therefore, from publishers and editors involved in the production of press and television news, through columnists who may be committed to daily writing without compulsory daily attendance at the premises, weekly columnists, regular and sporadic feature writers, free-lancers, consultants, to privileged sources, etc., there is a tendency to decreasing engagement. This decrease is almost always directly connected with other forms of earning a living, that is, with affi liation to other social worlds.
A borderline is established between journalists, professionals making their living from and living for journalism, and participants in the journalistic fi eld who, while taking advantage of the visibility that only the media can provide in the contemporary public space, "play another game", obey other rules, and are interested in other prizes. Thus, scholars, artists, physicians, and psychiatrists do not hesitate to use their circumstantial affi liation to the journalistic fi eld as a strategy for acquiring social distinction and legitimacy in their fi elds of origin.
Field theory is, accordingly, a way of responding to a series of scientifi c problems, but it may also, in turn, become a stumbling block to knowledge of the social world in that it makes one overlook the constant traffi c of agents between the fi elds where they are producers and those where they are simply spectators/consumers, or even the number of social positions that elude the logic of any given fi eld.
A fi eld will be more autonomous the more its participants are exclusively engaged in it, the more exclusively they struggle for its specifi c prizes and the more they embody its specifi c illusio. Therefore, we can measure the autonomy of the Brazilian journalistic fi eld by measuring to what extent there are actors who circulate in both the journalistic and political fi elds, using the former as an instrument for securing (or keeping) positions in the latter.
Belonging simultaneously to the journalistic and political fi elds in Brazil would be totally explicit if actors from a fi eld were competing for prizes pertaining to the other fi eld, exhibiting behaviors peculiar to the other fi eld, etc. Ultra-leftist critics, who seek to denounce "press manipulation" and the "lack of ethics among the powerful in the media", put forth quixotic arguments to this eff ect. The journalist Perseu Abramo (2003: 44) The 1988 Constitution, however, transferred the prerogative of granting and renewing radio and television concessions from the Executive Branch to the National Congress. Lima (2005: 1) notes that "the Constitution also forbid federal deputies and senators from signing contracts with or occupying positions, holding offi ces, performing functions at or receiving salaries from concessionaires of public services". In other words, belonging to these two fi elds is unconstitutional. See tables 1 and 2 for the dimension of the problem in Brazil: We note a large regional variation in the occurrence of "electronic coronelismo", which is more frequent in Northern and Northeastern states.
According to Santos and Capparelli (2005) In an eff ort to measure the infl uence of the political fi eld on the journalistic fi eld, Darras (2005) shows that political debate programs in
France and the US function as political institutions in which the selection of guests and subject matters is determined by the logic of the political fi eld rather than by the logic of the journalistic fi eld. In the same way, Cook (1998) claims that the news values connected with the economic pressures employed by journalists have been driving rulers to create and adapt public policies designed to draw the attention of the media 2 .
In this respect, according to Bourdieu (1996: 39) , "television is a communication device with very little autonomy, undergoing a series of pressures stemming from social relationships among journalists, relationships of ruthless competition, connivance, objective complicity, based on common interests related to their position in the fi eld of symbolic production and on their shared cognitive structures, categories of perception connected with their social background and education (or lack thereof)".
Nevertheless, a distinction between factors inside and outside the journalistic fi eld may lead one to overlook the fact that the journalistic fi eld is a social universe just on its way toward autonomy, with often undefi ned boundaries with other social universes. This is because one cannot discern in the journalistic fi eld strict uniqueness as regards regulations, strategies and prizes. Thus, journalistic decisions seldom obey, as recognized even by Bourdieu 3 , the logic of this social space.
The French sociologist also says that "the journalistic fi eld has very little autonomy, but this relative autonomy, however feeble it may be, means that nobody can understand events in the journalistic fi eld by simply observing the surrounding world. To understand journalism, it is not enough to learn who fi nances the media, who are the announcers, who provides subsidies, etc. Part of what is produced in the journalistic fi eld can only be understood if the researcher understands the fi eld as a microcosm and seeks to understand the eff ects people engaged in it produce on each other" (Bourdieu, 2005: 33) . This is what we do in the next section on postulating the existence of a specifi cally journalistic habitus.
(II) Habitus and the journalistic fi eld
Among the internal structures of the journalistic fi eld, there is a selfpreservation device objectifi ed in a constant twofold classifi cation of actions undertaken by the press. Journalism is lavish in self-criticism and indication of procedures, in the same measure as it is protective against attacks and criticisms from outside (BOURDIEU, 1996: 109) . The practice of self-criticism ensures an impression of autonomy, independence, and freedom on the part of the agents in the fi eld, while leaving outside the debate the structures of the fi eld, which largely condition actual practice.
When analyzing the dominance discourse and the attitude of students toward what they were told, there appeared a vague hypothesis of a progressive absorption of criticism by the fi eld as a tacit condition for expressing participation in this world. The amazement of students would become a tacit, if not enthusiastic, approval of criticism. Often, admiration for the speech would turn into praise of the speaker. In other words, structures determining practical action included an ontological critical dimension as a premise for the existence of the fi eld.
Examination of the main criticisms directed to journalism exhibit a surprising unity in the choice of arguments and targets, while the diff erentiation of both expected and condemned procedures evinces a connection of free criticism with discrete conditions for action in the journalistic fi eld. In other words, journalists' criticism of journalism appears as part of the structure of the fi eld -here, a device for legitimizing practical procedures through criticism of these very procedures.
An express condition for action within a fi eld, objectivity of procedure manifests itself in the apparent absence of prior references, concealing structures which are inherent to any codifi cation. Disseminated by the fi eld itself in order to secure its own existence, to win and maintain the trust of its public, criticism of the profession by its main representatives is a guarantee of independence. Practical procedure is presented as an abstract entity connected only with the agent's subjectivity.
Criticism of the profession is a procedure that is acquired as individuals become acquainted with the specifi c conditions in the production and practice of journalism. First-year students of communication specializing in journalism evince a sort of "fascination" for the profession, due to their connection with social worlds in which the prestige of the "man of letters", founded on a long and complex tradition (COHN, 1973) , is still very strong.
As they acquaint themselves with journalistic activities, through reporting, editing, and text production since their fi rst college years, the process is reversed. Learning the practice results in criticism of the practice, with due respect for the canon of what is conventionally considered good journalism. In both cases, the foundation is to be found in the transference of symbolic capital through the imitation of recognized actions in the spheres of practice and criticism.
Presenting the current norm as absolute eliminates the historical, and therefore material, dimension of its production, and fosters an impression of timelessness regarding the regulations of the practice and, therefore, its positioning beyond the reach of criticism. Historical modifi cations in the correct practice of the profession reveal the arbitrary elements in the successive conceptions of excellence in the profession. Our present rules, therefore, should be situated both historically and socially as constructions which are peculiar to a particular moment. At every moment history turns into rule as new rules are devised in opposition to old ones and are absorbed by the members of the fi eld.
There is a clearly paradoxical relation between independent criticism on the part of the journalist and the concomitant accommodation to the very mechanisms he is criticizing. This legitimizing eff ect is always related to the dominance discourse within the journalistic fi eld. Thus, there is far more at stake than the propagation of a model of journalism. Each faction intends to secure domination for its own trend within the fi eld and divest its competitors of their raison d'être. That is, they want to represent the latters' professional capital as minor, fallible and therefore useless.
The establishment of everyday practices is a complex phenomenon which is infl uenced by a diversity of action matrixes, regulated by a set of factors that are not to be accounted for either by the reduction of a behavior to the subject's volition nor by his submission to a specifi c spatial and temporal context. Pierre Bourdieu starts from the principle that objectives are built rather than given. Nonetheless, the world is not based solely on subjective -or volitional -representation, built on volition principles. Structures for the action of the subject are, fi rst of all, objective, pre-existent, and fundamental for a later understanding of the world by the subject.
The principle for this construction is the system of structured and structuring dispositions, which are constituted in practice and always directed to its practical sense. Such dispositions are absorbed by the agent in his social trajectory, especially from the family and educational institutions. This system of durable dispositions, applicable to any situation, a "structured structure", predisposed to operate as a "structuring structure", as a principle for the generation of practices and representations, is the habitus. The habitus, Bourdieu (1980: 88) explains, may be compared to a maestro, conducting the various parts of a subject's action in the fi elds in which he is located.
The habitus therefore is the "generating and regulating" principle of everyday practices, defi ned in its joint action with its context, in apparently spontaneous reactions of the subject. A particular social practice is produced by the relationship between an objective structure defi ning the social conditions for the production of the habitus and the conditions in which it may operate, that is the situation in which it is found.
The existence of a particular habitus comprises the tacit acceptance of rules for behavior within the fi eld, objectifi ed in the practice of rival and friendly agents. There is, however, a depersonalization of this situation which refers the student of journalism to a presumptive rule which would not be dependent on the subject -a phenomenon of reifi cation, as pointed out by Lukács. "It is journalism that turns the journalist into a master of journalism. The origin of journalism is the journalist. The origin of the journalist is journalism" (COSTA, 1991: 241) .
The professional habitus is the common matrix of the practices undertaken by all agents who are living or have lived in the same social conditions of professional existence. Thanks to these common dispositions coming from a shared perception of the world, which is socially shaped and interiorized along trajectories within the same universe, each professional, in obeying his "personal taste", unwittingly agrees with many agents driven to action under similar conditions 4 .
Bourdieu employs the "invisible maestro" metaphor to clarify this agreement. For, when it is realized as such, it becomes obvious, natural.
Thus, the causes for the phenomenon are simplifi ed by the economy of the identifi cation of specifi cally social processes leading to it 5 .
This common action, whether originating in pre-refl ective actions or not, is the raw material for the professional eidos. The homogenizing eff ects mentioned above cannot conceal the uniqueness of each trajectory in the fi eld. Behavior units, in spite of their singularity in the eyes of each observer, are realized as similar. Therefore, an unperceived factual set, which is the sum of professional behaviors in this or that universe, is superimposed on another sequence, perceived, made up of scenes that are partly imposed -in the eyes of the observer being socialized -by chance and partly sought after and found.
It is this last sequence that exists for the observer, and, therefore, the one that produces socializing eff ects on him. Accordingly, it is in this unique display that the journalistic eidos turns into subjective inclinations to act, that is, a journalistic habitus.
As already noted, every habitus is a sort of practical knowledge, that is, action-or praxis-oriented knowledge. Thus, given a particular situation, this praxis may be preceded by calculation, by conscious refl ection based on presumed eff ects and goals to be reached. Not always, however, is this calculation necessary. Constant observation of similar situations may elicit spontaneous and unrefl ected reactions from the social agent.
In short, practical knowledge is not always consciously learned and applied. Therefore, we will (a) fi rst approach the origin of the journalistic habitus, through the socializing observance of a routinized practice, and then (b) we will highlight the synthesis of this practice in dispositions to act or react in familiar situations.
(a) The origin of the journalistic habitus: routinized practice
In news production, a habitus mistake is a mismatch, a misadaptation of inner dispositions to objective social conditions. It may be caused by disruption of a factual order -the reality to be reported does not properly match the schemes for imparting interiorized value until then -or, more frequently, by a disruption of a practical nature. This may happen in socialization confl icts. Under which conditions of news production can these confl icts be seen?
The journalistic fi eld is made up of many sub-fi elds. Although these share aspects justifying the constitution of a general journalistic fi eld -relatively autonomous in relation to other social spaces -they are distinguished by unique features that also make them relatively autonomous social spaces. Thus, the television, radio, and printed media varieties of journalism are very close and, at the same time, singular as social spaces for a specifi c production and, therefore, the subjectivization which is peculiar to a certain kind of professional.
The same thing occurs with the journalism found in daily newspapers as opposed to weekly magazines. Ultimately, each company as a space comprising social positions is structured in a specifi c way and produces singular eff ects of subjectivization. These singularities give rise, in the case of a new position or space being occupied, to those mistakes we mentioned above. A previous social position would allow and demand acting "with one's eyes closed", a procedure made unfeasible by the unknown topography of the new space.
One of the diffi culties for acting in this new space is the conversion of one's social capital, accumulated during the trajectory followed in the previous space, into capital having validity in the new one. This conversion will be more onerous the more structured it is, the greater its autonomy in relation to other social spaces -autonomy as regards rules of behavior, prizes, actors, etc.
When analyzing the burdens involved in the occupation of a new space, sports host Milton Neves remarked on his experience at Super
Técnico, a program broadcast by Band TV: "Things that I used to do on radio without giving them a thought had to be relearned for television.
The fi rst days, alas, were a disaster. In terms of audience, I had to face people with a lot of experience".
These mistakes, however, are not the rule. The relative coherence of socializing processes allows for reasonably safe predictions, even when separate sequences involve larger units of diff erent natures, such as in the case of interviews. What one usually terms a "great insight", "a sense of opportunity", "a brilliant intuition" is really very often the result of a practical knowledge acquired through the sometimes painstaking observation of repetitions on the part of the people interviewed.
In the following text, dealing with preparation for interviews, the answers given by journalists reveal an aspect of the practice that is not always the outcome of calculation. "I was very straightforward in asking reporters whether they prepared themselves for an interview and whether their questions were planned beforehand. Essentially, I found the same answers in four countries: 'It depends.' The main diff erence is to be found in interviews regarding unusual events ('I have to plan the interview on the way', says a British reporter) and interviews arranged beforehand ('If it is an important person, such as a prime minister, I make a careful plan, for there is no one better prepared to detect ignorance on the part of interviewers', says another British reporter). As to time spent in preparation, an American reporter said: 'It depends: a few seconds; 30 to 45 minutes; ten years, perhaps!'" (COHEN, 1987: 119) .
As pointed out by Jô Soares, "don't ask me why, but well before the person sits down, I know whether the interview will be successful" 6 . Also Thus, the ability to evaluate and therefore classify a fact of phenomenal reality in relation to what is peculiar to the medium and other facts, to limits of varying natures acting on any editorial production, is the outcome of a certain type of training, a sui generis training, it is true. Daily repetition, which is inherent to a certain journalistic production and also, to a lesser degree, weekly repetition, lead to -or perhaps, force -the ingraining of associations between event and news that become natural, solid, and crystallized. It is a sui generis learning process because it dispenses with refl ection. Following the reporter, it is like smelling out the news..
The routinized dimension of journalistic work is evident, although not clearly stressed, in the account given by Isabel Siqueira Travancas (1992) . The use of the present indicative in the account reinforces the daily repetition of procedures. Thus: "she leaves her things on the table, greets me and then goes to talk with the man responsible for the schedule. He is fi nishing the schedule for the day, and she gives him suggestions. (As usual) there is nothing yet for her. She browses through the newspapers, and comments on yesterday's subject.
"She looks forward to a schedule, an interesting one, preferably. From that brief talk you can observe how a good subject matter is defi nedthat piece of news that elicits a wide reaction, that is on the front page, is read by all and is the object of comments, generally good and fl attering.
An important factor in the routine is the delay in defi ning the schedule.
The longer it takes for a reporter to go out, the longer it will take him to return. The ideal for every reporter is to arrive, take his schedule and go out. Otherwise, when he is about to leave, another subject matter appears, and this spoils the timetable. It is no wonder many of them say, when their time to leave is near, certain reporters hide behind their terminals or go to the toilet." This account equates journalistic work with professional activities of a bureaucratic nature 8 , recognized as repetitive 9 .
Therefore, in the same way, the distance between two people seldom is the subject of outright calculation. This is only necessary when one is faced with a relatively, or more rarely, an absolutely new situation.
Thus, almost always, the repetition of similar approximations allows for a topographic adaptation of the distance between bodies to various kinds of theme, location, and social position of the interlocutors.
This adaptation is neither memory nor understanding: a contraction which allows for the translation of continuous learning into instant, behavior-generating practical knowledge is not refl ection, but a synthesis of time. At this point, time, trajectory, and habitus converge. This contraction of experiences is not a synthesis carried out by the subject, but a part of it 10 . Thus, observing the criteria of activeness and passiveness of the subject, made popular by law with the categories of "active subject" and "passive subject", we qualify the synthesis of a social trajectory in a single moment of passive synthesis, because it is not refl ective, because it institutes subjectivity and therefore is prior to it.
Gerson Moreira Lima 11 usually gives his students the following example:
"Romário and Ronaldinho have their legs broken on the same day. Which one of them will get the headline? They take some time to answer. In other words, passive synthesis is the effi cient cause of subjectivity; it is the device or the process of subjectivization, and therefore cannot depend on any decision by the subject nor be under his control. On the contrary, it is imposed on him, not always in the same way and with the same intensity. Instances of the realization of factual sequences perceived by the subject as repetitions in unique trajectories are unequal, as regards both quality and quantity, and thus produce varying eff ects.
Therefore, not only can we observe the subjective eff ect produced by the observation of "repeated" social actions, but also assess the strength of this eff ect, that is, the expectation of a supervening element from the sequence generated by the realization of an eff ect immediately prior to it.
As Deleuze (1968: 96) puts it, "imagination contracts the cases, elements, homogeneous moments, and these coalesce into an internal qualitative impression with a certain weight". Discussing the degree of determinism in practical knowledge embodied in the form of a habitus is to specify the moment in which the calculation of costs and benefi ts becomes necessary for action.
It should be pointed out that this passive synthesis, a genus of which the Bourdieusian habitus is a species, is not exhausted by the unconsciousness of experiences. In other words, there is nothing to prevent synthesized experiences, undiff erentiated in a condensed perceptual magma, a sort of one-point trajectory, from being recovered by memory, understanding, and from being assessed and classifi ed in terms of cognitive referentials and of a repertoire.
We do not go back thereby to the original state of observed things, "to that state of matter which does not produce a case before another one has vanished" (DELEUZE, 1968: 98) . However, starting from passive synthesis, from a unique imagining process, memory reconstructs discrete points of the trajectory and produces, now actively, a sort of decompression.
This, in opposition to the compression of passive synthesis, is developed under the aegis of refl ection and understanding. Conscious identifi cation of this or that point of the course does not change dispositions to act determined by passive synthesis.
Thus, the virginity metaphor, which is so dear to many handbooks on journalistic methodology in their eff ort to indicate eidetic or transcendental suspension, leads the reporter or researcher to the illusion of a possibly brand-new quality of investigation, of conscious defi nition of a gap in the trajectory, which, although subject to cogitation in the active stage of decompression, fi nds its limits in passive synthesis, over which he has no control.
Thus, if every investigation, either journalistic or scientifi c, exhibits teleological, "fi nal" causes, usually specifi ed in the statement of research goals or in the discussion of journalistic functions, one cannot lose sight of its eff ective causes, material and social conditions in the production of scholarly journalistic discourse, which are not limited to the most conspicuous hierarchical relationships of an infrastructural nature, but are extended to interiorized manners of acting, peculiar to their respective fi elds.
While exhibiting discrete features, compression and decompression do not preclude but rather complement each other. Any refl ection or calculation is based on a refl ective practice, profoundly interiorized during a long course of refl ections. In the same way, any memory-based reconstruction of this course resorts to a recalling habitus, a habitus of search, an associationist practice that connects new sensory experiences to prior referentials, organizes discovered information, and, circumstances being favorable, devises an account.
The combination of active and passive syntheses aff ords us refl ections of a deontological nature on investigation and reporting, refl ections that try to avoid a more or less socially authorized impressionism, based on the varying degrees of credibility of its spokesman. An instance of this combination is the (fostered and rewarded) journalistic drive, the socalled reporter's vocation which, in the competition among peers -where the attainment of fresh news is a prize that determines and imparts value -leads the individual to resort to the most effi cient means of obtaining it.
Thus, deception in the relationship with the source, through the adoption of behavior and investigation strategies criminally tending to arouse mistaken expectations, is increasingly becoming part of journalistic culture.
Thus, even the most critical trends of journalism concentrate their analyses on the conscious and refl ected-upon options of news production, as if these could thoroughly account for this particular form of production.
By ignoring modes of practical knowledge not based on refl ection, apocalyptic and integrated individuals share the same representation of journalistic praxis, centered on reason and calculation and bypassing relevant ethical and moral issues.
NOTES
1 Hallin (2005) details in what aspects the media diff er from political parties and organized social groups.
2 A Brazilian variation of this are the "projetos-bandeira" (fl ag bills), proposed by congressmen for the sole purpose of appearing before the voters as sponsors of interesting projects, while being aware that they do not stand much chance of being passed. See Ricci (2003) and Diniz (2005) .
3 "Journalistic decision-making is largely determined by economic pressures that elude the adversarial logic of this body of information professionals" (BOURDIEU, 1994).
4 Two complementary statements testify to the validity of the comment on the expected ethical conduct of the journalist: fi rst, the statement by Heródoto Barbeiro (interviewed by us on 05/04/01): "The fundamental issue is the good faith any journalist must have. Technical issues, such as speaking on the microphone or writing for the radio, may be learned. However, the constant and responsible search for factual truth is the key to being a good communication professional." To the same eff ect, here is the principle posited by Bernardo Ajzenberg (interviewed by us on 06/08/01): "Either the person is ethical or not. And this applies to any profession or occupation. This is even more so in the case of journalists, because they have ethical responsibilities."
5 Of course, not all the agreements found in discrete professional universes result from the habitus. Collective practice is also partly determined by explicit strategies and calculations, consciously defi ned orientations and projects, slogans, and collectively taken decisions. However, there is a rich literature concerning these actions.
6 Interview conducted by Hebe Camargo on 09/08/01.
7 Interviewed by us on 07/25/01.
8 The following statement inscribes the professional activity of journalists in a set of typically routinized procedures. "The typical reporter is a respectable citizen. Either at home or at work, it seems diffi cult to set him apart from any other professional. He performs his daily work, generally under supervision, comes back home at night, pays his taxes, signs bills for the laundry and the milkman, and goes out with his kids on Sunday" (WARREN, 1975: 13) .
